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can help to identify cases of real concern. The primary responsibility to address municipal 
financial problems lies with the municipality, but other parties also have a role to play. 
Financial problems have different causes and will differ in severity. Consequently, different 
tools are appropriate, depending on the cause, severity and aggrieved party. These tools 
include discretionary and mandatory financial recovery plans, debt relief and 
restructuring. Where a municipal financial crisis amounts to a disaster, further tools can 
come into play. We hope that this exploration of legal remedies will stimulate greater 
action to resolve financial problems in municipalities. This article addresses situations 
where a municipality is already faced with financial distress , and does not delve into 
measures aimed at preventing municipal financial distress.1 
Keywords: Municipality, financial crisis, local government, intervention, financial 
recovery, financial disaster, South Africa, financial problem. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION  
Since the dawn of the democratic era, some South African municipalities have 
experienced financial distress.2 In recent years, these financial failures have received 
more attention from provincial governments, from national government, and from the 
press. Some recent events helped focus attention on financial management problems in 
municipalities: 1) the 2018 collapse of  VBS Bank, which resulted in significant losses to 
municipalities which had invested (in violation of the applicable regulations) in the 
mutual bank; 2) the record number of service delivery protests (237 of which took place 
in 2018 and 218 in 2019);3 and 3) unfavourable reports from the Auditor - General, 
indicating that fruitless and wasteful expenditure cost municipalities R2,07 billion in the 
2018/19 financial year.4 The research question that this article aims to answer is : what 
 
1 This research was conducted with the financial support of the National Research Foundation of South 
Africa (NRF) (Grant No 115581). All viewpoints and errors are the authors' own. The authors wish to 
extend their gratitude to Professor Klaus Beiter, Professor Anél du Plessis, Dr Caiphas Soyapi and Ms 
Rolien Roos for their comments on earlier versions of this article 
2  Wandrag R "The quest for financial discipline at local government level: the regulation of municipal 
borrowing and financial emergencies" 2003 Law, Democracy and Development 243 at 245. Wandrag 
highlights that in 1999, 843 municipalities were facing financial difficulties. Also see Roos R & Stander L 
"Insolvent municipalities? An analysis of the debt relief mechanisms at the disposal of municipalities 
and the disappearance of the 'advantage of the creditor'" (2007) 22 South African Public Law 166 at 
166. 
3  Greffrath W & van der Walt G "Section 139 Interventions in South African Local Government, 1994-
2015" available at 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/310334863_Section_139_Interventions_in_South_African_L
ocal_Government_1994-2015 and Stoddard E "Municipal IQ data shows lockdowns stifled SA social 
unrest this year – but 2020 is not over yet" (2020) Daily Maverick available at 
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-08-24-municipal-iq-data-shows-lockdowns-stifled-sa-
social-unrest-this-year-but-2020-is-not-over-yet/ (accessed 20 November 2020). 
4  See  AGSA "MFMA 2018/19 local government audit outcomes" (2020) 17 available at 
https://www.agsa.co.za/Portals/0/Reports/MFMA/201819/GR/MFMA%20GR%202018-
19%20Final%20View.pdf (accessed 21 October 2020) read with Morais S "Municipalities owed Eskom 
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legal remedies are available, and to whom, when a municipality faces financial distress, 
from whatever cause.   
Previous research has been done globally on municipalities in financial distress 
with the objective of determining what the possible causes thereof can be and how to 
detect them.5 Some provided background on the development of municipalities in 
respect of their financial viability, where the history of non-payment for services is 
highlighted, and an analysis of municipal income is provided.6 Other studies focused on 
whether the internal controls in municipal financial management influence governance 
in municipal entities and whether the subsequent audit findings of the Auditor-General 
have any effect.7   
Poor oversight of municipalities, external or internal, as underlying reasons for 
poor performance, have also been documented.8 However the question  why these 
problems are so widespread, and why interventions to date have been ineffective in 
remedying the situation remains unanswered.9 These studies have either focused on 
proactive financial governance or the causes of financial mismanagement, leaving space 
for research into what could be done when a municipality already finds itself in financial 
distress.10 
Roos and Stander11 have conducted some research into the debt relief measures 
available to municipalities in financial distress with a focus on the measures in place to 
protect creditors. Their study further elaborated on the possibility of sequestrating or 
liquidating a municipality.12 Other studies analysed provincial interventions as 
 
R9bn last year -10 statistics that show how they wasted your money" (2019) News24 available at 
https://www.news24.com/Analysis/analysis-municipalities-owed-eskom-r91bn-last-year-10-
statistics-that-show-how-they-wasted-your-money-20190626 (accessed 9 August 2019). 
5  See Watson DJ, Handley DM & Hassett WL "Financial distress and municipal bankruptcy: the case of 
Prichard, Alabama" 2015 Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Management 129 at 131; Cohen S, 
Doumpos M, Neofytou E & Zopounidis C "Assessing financial distress where bankruptcy is not an 
option: an alternative approach for local municipalities" 2012 European Journal of Operational Research 
270 at 271 and Garcia-Sanchez et al "A new predictor of local financial distress" 2012 International 
Journal of Public Administration 739 at 740.  
6  Fourie D "Assessment of the financial resources of municipalities" (1998) 1(2) SAJEMS 268 at 268 & 
271. 
7  Ncgobo D "Internal controls, governance and audit outcomes" (2017) 9 (5) African Journal of Public 
Affairs 74 at 75. 
8  Mello MD "Monitoring and evaluation: the missing link in South African municipalities" (2018) Journal 
for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa 1 at 1. 
9  Roos & Stander (2007) at 166. See also Wandrag (2003) at 244. See also Mathiba G & Lefenya K 
“Revitalising the role of the Auditor-General under the auspices of the Public Audit Amendment Act 5 of 
2018: a quest for public financial accountability” (2019) 54 Journal of Public Administration 532 at 532. 
10  Roos & Stander (2007) at 166. See also Wandrag (2003) at 244. 
11  Roos & Stander (2007) at 166. 
12  Roos & Stander (2007) at 167. 
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processes to improve municipal financial health.13 Some of these studies conducted 
some empirical research to gain insights on the implementation of provincial 
interventions. 14  This research explored the trends and nature of provincial 
interventions and whether some key steps in the intervention process are complied 
with by provincial government.15 However, these studies leave some room for deeper 
research into the specifics of financial recovery plans and debt restructuring as part of 
the intervention process, as well as other tools available to help municipalities to regain 
their financial health. Previous studies have also maintained a focus on provincial 
governments as role players in addressing municipal financial distress, and there is thus 
some room to investigate what other role players can do to address municipal financial 
distress. 
The relevant legislation has also been subject to judicial interpretation.16 Judicial 
interpretation has taught that some responses to municipal financial distress, such as 
section 139 of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,1996, (Constitution) 
must be read within the relevant constitutional framework, such as, local government 





13  De Visser J & November J "Overseeing the overseers: assessing compliance with municipal intervention 
rules in South Africa" (2017) Hague Journal on the Rule Law 109 at 110; Ledger T & Rampedi M Mind 
the gap: section 139 interventions in theory and in practice Johannesburg : Public Affairs Research 
Institute (2019) at 25; Greffrath W & Van der Walt G "Section 139 Interventions in South African Local 
Government, 1994-2015" available at 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/310334863_Section_139_Interventions_in_South_African_
Local_Government_1994-2015 at 2 (accessed 20 November 2020); Murray C & Hoffman-Wanderer Y 
"The National Council of Provinces and provincial intervention in local government" (2007) Stell LR 7 
at 10. Hoffman-Wanderer Y & Murray C "Suspension and dissolution of municipal councils under 
section 139 of the Constitution" (2007) TSAR 141 at 141. 
14  Greffrath W & Van der Walt G "Section 139 Interventions in South African Local Government, 1994-
2015" available at 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/310334863_Section_139_Interventions_in_South_African_
Local_Government_1994-2015 at 2 (accessed 20 November 2020); Ledger  & Rampedi   (2019) at 25 
and De Visser  & November (2017) at 110. 
15  Greffrath W & Van der Walt G "Section 139 Interventions in South African Local Government, 1994-
2015" at 2, available at 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/310334863_Section_139_Interventions_in_South_African_
Local_Government_1994-2015  at 2 (accessed 20 November 2020) ; Ledger  & Rampedi  (2019) ) at 25 
and De Visser  & November J (2017) at 110. 
16  Mnquma Local Municipality & another v Premier of the Eastern Cape & others [2009] ZAECBHC 
(Mnquma (2009)) 14 and Mogalakwena Local Municipality v Provincial Executive Council, Limpopo & 
others [2014] ZAGPPHC 400.  
17  Mnquma (2009) at 40. 
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2 THE STATUS QUO OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS IN SOUTH AFRICAN 
MUNICIPALITIES 
Previous research, both in South Africa and globally, has considered the causes of 
municipal financial distress, and some indicators of such problems.18 It is important to 
understand that causes and indicators are different things.  
Some causes of financial distress are beyond the municipality’s control but are 
within the control of the Parliament. These are often described as unfunded mandates, 
ie functions which a municipality is required to perform, but for which adequate 
revenue instruments are not provided. Ultimately, these must be addressed by adjusting 
the intergovernmental framework to either reduce mandates or increase funding 
capacity (through transfers or appropriate own-source revenue instruments). 
At other times, there are economic shifts19 that challenge a formerly sustainable 
municipality, eg when the main employer in a mining town shuts down; This is a 
transitional challenge, as to which external assistance may be necessary until revenues 
and expenditure can be brought into alignment. Another topical example one can 
consider is the current COVID-19 pandemic, which brought with it a number of impacts, 
one of which was additional financial obligations for municipalities. 
Some financial problems are internal to the municipality itself. These include (1) 
lack of proper financial mismanagement, such as under-collection of revenues or 
uncontrolled expenditure; and (2) political dysfunction, such as that demonstrated in 
the City of Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay in 2019-2020. Some authors have focused 
on internal controls related to governance of municipal entities and on the effect of the 
Auditor- General’s audit findings.20 Furthermore, the lack of capacity which leads to 
poor management is often mentioned.  
At the beginning of the democratic era, the history of non-payment for services was 
highlighted.21 That is important, and since we will see that the community is also part of 
the municipality and responsible for its financial health, we can consider this as an issue 
within the municipality’s control. 
Any municipality bears the primary responsibility to identify, avoid, and solve all of 
its financial problems.22 A municipality includes its political structures, its 
administrative structures, and its community.23 Therefore, the political structures, 
 
18  Watson , Handley  & Hassett  (2015)  at 131. See also Cohen , Doumpos , Neofytou  & Zopounidis   
(2012)  at 271 and Garcia-Sanchez et al "A new predictor of local financial distress" (2012) 
International Journal of Public Administration 739 at 740. 
19  Watson , Handley  & Hassett WL (2005)  at 134 and Cahill AG & James JA "Responding to municipal 
fiscal distress: an emerging issue for state governments in the 1990s" (1992) Public Administration 
Review 88 at 91. 
20  Ncgobo (2017) at 75. 
21  Fourie D  (1998) at 268-271. 
22  Section 135(1) of the Local Government : Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003. 
23  Section 2 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
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administrative structures, and the community all share the responsibility to identify, 
avoid, and solve their municipality's financial distress. While the causes of financial 
distress can be complicated and varied, the solution inevitably includes bringing 
revenues and expenditures into alignment.  Accordingly, the constitutional and 
statutory remedies described herein must be applied to achieve that end, even as 
investigations and interventions to address the underlying causes continue.  Money is 
the lifeblood of any municipality, so the first step must be to stop the bleeding.  
The Institute of Directors’ King IV Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa 
(King IV Report)24 identifies the municipal council as the governing body of a 
municipality.25 The municipal council, as a governing body, has primary accountability 
and responsibility for the governance and performance of the municipality.26 The 
municipal council is therefore primarily responsible for identifying, avoiding, and 
solving any municipal financial distress as it arises. The administration and the 
community also have a role to play, but the council’s role is primary. The King IV Report  
states that municipalities do not have shareholders in the traditional sense, but that in 
several respects the community acts as the shareholders of the municipality.27 
The Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (Systems Act) provides in 
section 2(d) that a municipality has a separate legal personality.28 Even though 
municipalities are juristic persons, they are unique entities and differ from private 
sector juristic persons in a few fundamental ways. First,  private sector juristic persons 
offer services or goods on a competitive basis; municipalities, on the other hand, 
generate most of their own-source revenues in a largely monopolistic market (and some 
services are essential for survival and comfort). A second difference is that most 
municipal assets cannot be liquidated for the benefit of creditors, either because the 
assets (roads, sidewalks, parks, landfills, etc) have little market value or because they 
are necessary for the provision of basic municipal services, and thus protected by law. A 
third difference is that unlike private sector juristic persons, municipalities have 
perpetual existence. They cannot be wound down and dissolved, because they are 
constitutionally mandated instruments of governance and service provision.   
Although some municipalities, including metros and secondary cities, are in 
reasonably good financial shape, the press has raised the alarm about the potential 
 
24  This Report contains principles which should be implemented to achieve good corporate governance. 
Because municipalities function like businesses as far as generating their own income and being 
responsible for their own expenditure are concerned, this Report devotes Part 4.6 to municipalities. 
This section sets out some principles to be applied in assuring that the corporate/business side of 
municipalities is governed through the use of good corporate governance practices. 
25  King IV Report at 80. 
26  King IV Report at 12. 
27  King IV Report at 80. 
28  This section provides that a municipality has separate legal personality which excludes liability on the 
part of its community for the actions of the municipality. 
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"collapse" of the municipal sector.29 Ratings Afrika, in its latest municipal financial 
sustainability index, showed that most of South Africa's municipalities are factually 
commercially bankrupt, ie their liabilities exceed their assets and  they do not have 
sufficient liquidity to meet their operating costs.30 To help the public identify cases of 
genuine concern, National Treasury has begun to publish, on its website, a chart that 
identifies municipalities with serious financial problems.31 This chart shows how 
municipalities stand in terms of the criteria  listed in sections 138 and 140 of the Local 
Government : Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 (MFMA).  The chart 
reports on which municipalities have issues listed as criteria in sections 138 and 140 of 
the MFMA, such as, failed to make payments when due, defaulted on financial 
obligations, submitted their financial statements late to the Auditor-General, etc. In 
these charts we see that as at June 2020, 200 municipalities had more than R1 million in 
outstanding debts and are more than 90 days overdue (this is a majority of the 
municipalities in South Africa), 54 municipalities show an operating deficit of more than 
5 per cent of their total direct revenue, and 146 municipalities have problems with their 
financial statements.32 Unfortunately, these figures have been generally getting worse 
over time.   
The impact of this analysis is thus that factors indicative of a serious financial 
problem are present in the majority of municipalities. The chart also contains a section 
which is derived from section 140(2)(c) of the MFMA, which specifies that a failure to 
timeously pay debts which, in the aggregate, amount to more than 2 per cent of 
budgeted operating expenditure, is an indicator of serious material breach of financial 
commitments. At the end of FY 2019/20, 82 municipalities had triggered this section of 
the MFMA ; this is a minority of municipalities, but still a substantial concern.  In such 
cases, section 139 of the MFMA and section 139(5) of the Constitution both mandate 
provincial intervention.33  
 
29  Ryan C "Municipal sector faces collapse – Ratings Afrika" (2019) Moneyweb available at 
https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/south-africa/municipal-sector-faces-collapse-ratings-afrika/ 
(accessed 9 May 2019). 
30  Ryan C "Insight: Why municipalities, except in the Western Cape are failing miserably" Citizen available 
at https://citizen.co.za/business/business-news/2338777/insight-why-municipalities-except-in-the- 
R3LkuoMwestern-cape-are-failing-miserably/?fbclid=IwAzEDacu3FZ_FGInCitjvOmVw6-
wKm1Dv7nIaWiUlXNoEpPm2m6U4 (accessed 26 October 2020). 
31  National Treasury "Municipalities meeting criteria for determining serious financial problems in terms 
of section 138 & 140 of the MFMA" (2020) available at 
http://mfma.treasury.gov.za/Media_Releases/s71/1920/4th_1920/Documents/s139%20Targets%20
-%20Q4%202019_20%20-%20FY%20and%20Pro%20Rata%20Budget%20v1%20-%20Final%20-
%2018%20Sept%202020.xlsx (accessed 16 October 2020). This chart is based on the factors listed in 
ss 138 and 140 of the MFMA. It indicates whether these factors are present in which municipalities. 
This chart thus shows whether municipalities are experiencing some factors listed in the MFMA which 
are indicative of financial distress. We will refer to that chart at various points in this article. It is too 
large to reproduce here, and we encourage readers to consult it as appropriate. 
32  Statistics as at 30 June 2020. 
33  Statistics as at 30 June 2020. 
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3 FINANCIAL CRISES AND SERIOUS FINANCIAL PROBLEMS 
A legal depiction or definition of financial distress in South African municipalities can be 
found in the  MFMA. The MFMA refers to financial problems and financial crises, the 
latter being the more serious of the two. This part will explain what both these terms 
entail. The MFMA divides financial distress into two categories: (1) "serious financial 
problems”, as described in MFMA section 138, and (2) "serious or persistent breaches of 
financial commitments" resulting from a financial crisis, as described in MFMA section 
140.   
3.1 What is a "serious financial problem" in local government law? 
The less acute of the two types of municipal financial distress highlighted in the MFMA 
is serious financial problems. Although no definition is provided, section 138 of the 
MFMA sets out criteria for determining "serious financial problems" and provides that 
the following factors, singly or in combination, may indicate a serious financial problem.  
These criteria include the following :  the municipality fails to make any payments 
when due or  defaults on financial obligations because of its financial situation; the 
actual expenses of the municipality exceed its actual income for more than two 
consecutive financial years; the municipality has a deficit in its operating budget 
amounting to five per cent of the total revenue in its recent financial year; the 
municipality is more than 60 days late in submitting its financial documents to the 
Auditor-General or the Auditor-General withholds its opinion or issues a disclaimer; any 
of the aforementioned criteria are present in a municipal entity; any other material 
condition that is indicative that the municipality will be unable to fulfil its obligations 
due to financial reasons.34 
3.2 What constitutes a "financial crisis" in local government law? 
The more serious of the two types of financial distress as referred to in the MFMA is a 
financial crisis. As a starting point, the Constitution in section 139(5) introduces the 
concept of a financial crisis as a municipality's failure to fulfil its mandate to provide 
basic services or to fulfil its financial obligations because of its financial situation, or 
when the municipality admits that it is unable to do so. 35  
Sections 139 and 140 of the  MFMA provide further guidance on what constitutes a 
"crisis" in a municipality's financial affairs.  In section 139(1) the MFMA begins by 
exactly tracking the wording of the Constitution, section 139(5): 
“ (1) If a municipality, as a result of a crisis in its financial affairs, is in serious or 
persistent material breach of its obligations to provide basic services or to meet 
its financial commitments, or admits that it is unable to meet its obligations or 
financial commitments, the relevant provincial executive must....”36 
 
34  Section 138 of the MFMA. 
35  Section 139(5) of the Constitution. 
36  Section 139(1) of the MFMA. 
  
  MUNICIPALITIES IN FINANCIAL DISTRESS 
 
Page | 421  
 
Like its constitutional counterpart, this subsection goes on to specify what the 
provincial executive must do. Note that both section 139(5) of the Constitution and 
section 139(1) of the MFMA are mandatory: the provincial executive must act in the 
circumstances described. 
The MFMA, in section 140, then specifies which conditions must be present for a 
mandatory intervention in terms of section 139.  In other words, it sets out the criteria 
for determining if there is a financial crisis.  Section 140(1) provides that "all relevant 
facts must be considered”.  Note that both the Constitution and the MFMA speak of 
serious or persistent material breaches of a municipality’s obligations.  Each of these 
concepts is spelled out in more detail.  Concerning a "serious material breach," section 
140(2) of the MFMA states that some factors are indicative of a municipality not 
fulfilling its financial obligations. These factors include the following : the municipality 
is not paying lenders or investors when due; the municipality does not meet its 
contractual (those which provide security in terms of section 48) obligations; the 
municipality does not pay monies when due, which, individually or cumulatively, adds 
up to more than two per cent of the municipality's current operating expenses budget; 
the municipality's non-payment has or is likely to have an adverse impact on the 
availability or price of credit to the local government sector. 
As regards a "persistent material breach," section 140(3) of the MFMA adds that 
this is a continuous or recurring failure of a municipality to pay its debts and that this 
failure substantially impairs the ability of municipalities to procure goods, services or 
credit on usual commercial terms.37 
To summarise, both section 139 of the Constitution and section 139 of the MFMA 
speak in terms of a crisis in a municipality’s financial affairs which results in a serious or 
persistent material breach of municipal obligations.38  The "serious or persistent 
material breach" must be rooted in a financial crisis, but, in theory at least, the crisis can 
manifest either in service delivery failures ("persistent material breach of its obligations 
to provide basic services") or in financial failures ("serious or persistent material 
breach of financial commitments").39 For example, the failure of the Amahlathi Local 
Municipality (which  at the time of writing is subject to a provincial intervention) to pay 
employees’ salaries which amount to 55 per cent of that municipality's expenditure 
budget would qualify as a serious or persistent material breach of the municipality's 
financial obligations.40  
Although a financial crisis can lead to a breach of either financial obligations or 
service delivery obligations, the emphasis in the MFMA is on financial obligations. This 
emphasis is logical in an Act that deals with financial management.  The burden of 
 
37  Section 140(3) of the MFMA. 
38  Wandrag (2003) at 255. 
39  Wandrag (2003) at 257. 
40  Sgqolana T "Council hits day zero" (2019) Herald available at  
https://www.heraldlive.co.za/news/politics/2019-05-27-council-hits-day-zero/ (accessed 9 August 
2019). 
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establishing a breach of a service delivery obligation would usually be harder to meet 
for the following reasons: as both a legal and a technical matter, establishing exactly 
what the municipal service delivery obligations are in a specific context is difficult41, 
and in addition, establishing the link between a service delivery failure and a financial 
crisis adds a layer of complexity that may not be necessary.  
Since, the MFMA provides little detail,  it would also be necessary to navigate a 
complex maze consisting of the Constitution, the relevant sectoral legislation with its 
regulations,42 and any norms or service delivery standards that the municipality itself 
may have set , when determining whether a serious or persistent material breach of 
service delivery is taking place.   For example, would a disruption in water service 
delivery in a posh area of the leafy suburbs, after decades of reliable service provision, 
be a breach of a service delivery obligation, if it resulted from a re-prioritisation of 
resources in favour of other areas with less adequate services?  It may be said that there 
are massive problems with service delivery in many municipalities, but it may be 
difficult to legally establish that a service delivery problem amounts to a serious or 
persistent breach of the municipality’s obligations , and that the breach is due to a crisis 
in the municipality’s financial affairs. Among other things, it may be difficult to obtain 
the evidence which is required to prove the above. 
To further illustrate the difficulty of proving a serious or persistent breach to 
provide a basic service, consider the following: Bloem Water reduced water pressure, 
which affected the community of the Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality, as a result of 
an unpaid debt of R 247 million owed by the Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality.43  In 
this case, it is not clear that the reduced water pressure would constitute a serious and 
persistent breach of the municipality’s service delivery obligations.  In other instances, a 
breach might be more apparent. The persistent failure of Emfuleni Local Municipality to 
pay electricity and water bills led to services being reduced or cut. The municipality's 
deficiencies in maintaining its infrastructure further decreased its ability to provide 
water and electricity and led to major sewage spills. Moreover, solid waste collection 
collapsed, and the municipality's entire vehicle fleet was repossessed.44 
 
41  Mazibuko & others v City of Johannesburg & others 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC) para 40. Municipal service 
delivery is subject to progressive realisation within their available means, rendering each 
municipality's service delivery obligations unique. Thus, establishing what the municipal service 
delivery obligations are in a specific context is difficult. 
42  Pertaining to the minimum standards of basic service delivery. For example, GN R509 in GG 22355 of 8 
June 2001 (Regulations relating to compulsory national standards and measures to conserve water). 
43  Morapela K "Mangaung Municipality, Bloem water in court over supply" (2019) Citizen available at 
https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/courts/2155610/mangaung-municipality-bloem-water-in-
court-over-supply/ (accessed 9 August 2019). This is also a good example of a breach of a municipal 
financial obligation. 
44  Pieterse M "How structural flaws contribute to the crisis in South Africa's municipalities" (2019) 
University of Witwatersrand available at https://www.wits.ac.za/news/latest-news/in-their-own-
words/2018/2018-08/how-structural-flaws-contribute-to-the-crisis-in-south-africas-
municipalities.html (accessed 9 August 2019). 
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4 RESPONSES PROVIDED IN LEGISLATION SPECIFICALLY FOR A MUNICIPAL 
FINANCIAL PROBLEM 
4.1 How the MFMA deals with financial distress 
The MFMA provides clearly that "the primary responsibility to avoid, identify and 
resolve financial problems in a municipality rests with the municipality itself ”.45 In 
principle, this is as simple as reducing expenditure to a level that can be met by 
available revenues, from both own-sources and national transfers. No municipality 
should be incurring expenditure that it cannot afford, even if it is for a worthy purpose.  
A poor municipality is one problem, an insolvent municipality is a much worse problem.  
If a municipality is in over its head, and cannot find its own way back to solvency, then 
Chapter 13 of the MFMA provides for a process especially formulated to support 
municipalities in recovering from financial distress. This process consists of provincial 
interventions with recovery plans and debt restructuring as part of such a process.46  
Additional legal tools can be found in other legislation to help municipalities 
recover from financial distress.47 In the event of financial distress, the municipality must 
seek solutions and notify the MECs for Local Government and Finance together with the 
South African Local Government Association (SALGA).48 This co-operation is consistent 
with the constitutional paradigm of separate  spheres of government which are 
"distinctive, interdependent and interrelated”.49  The underlying assumption is that, in 
the ordinary course of things, municipalities can and should manage their financial 
affairs. 
4.1.1 Provincial Interventions 
In addition, in the ordinary course of events, the Constitution places a duty on provincial 
government to monitor and support local government.50 Provincial government should 
provide the necessary oversight to avoid a financial problem turning into a crisis.51 The 
Systems Act specifically nominates the MEC for Local Government to bear this 
monitoring responsibility. The MFMA also places a responsibility on the MEC for Local 
Government to determine, upon investigation, whether a provincial intervention into 
municipal affairs is justified in any given set of circumstances.52 The MFMA  bestows the 
responsibility for monitoring municipal financial matters on the provincial treasury, 
which should, in terms of the MFMA, promote sound financial governance and may take 
appropriate steps against a municipality for non-compliance with the MFMA.53 
Provincial government should detect and investigate service delivery issues rooted in 
 
45  Section 135(1) of the MFMA. 
46  Chapter 13 of the MFMA. 
47  These tools will be discussed in further detail in part 4.2. 
48  Section 135(3) of the MFMA. 
49  Section 40 of the Constitution. 
50  Section 155(6)(a) of the Constitution and De Visser  & November  (2017) at 133. 
51  Mello (2018) at 1. 
52  Section 136 of the MFMA and Wandrag (2003) at 260. 
53  Sections 2 & 5(4)(d) of the MFMA. 
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financial distress and must intervene to help solve municipal financial distress in 
certain instances.54  
A serious financial problem is already worrisome, and the municipality may well 
have missed some payments. In such cases, the province has a discretion as to whether 
or not to intervene and impose a recovery plan.  However, when the problem becomes 
more serious (eg failure to pay a lender or investor, which the MFMA treats more 
seriously than other payment issues) and/or persistent (eg consistent failure to pay 
suppliers, which would impair the municipality’s ability to procure goods, services or 
credit on usual commercial terms), then action in accordance with the MFMA is no 
longer discretionary – it is required. The MFMA provides for discretionary and 
mandatory provincial interventions.  
Different provincial interventions can be instituted, based on the underlying causes 
for a municipality's financial distress.55 The correct diagnosis of the cause of the 
financial distress is key in determining what intervention should be used, because 
different grounds for intervention are associated with specific remedies.56 In the first 
instance, an intervention can be instituted when a municipality cannot or does not fulfil 
an executive or financial obligation.57 The second ground justifying a provincial 
intervention is when a municipality does not adopt a budget or financial instrument in 
fulfilment of a budget as prescribed by law.58 The last instance is when a municipality 
experiences a financial crisis, rendering it unable to fulfil certain financial obligations or 
unable to provide basic services.59 The first instance is ground for discretionary 
interventions, whilst the latter two are grounds for mandatory interventions.60 The aim 
of either type of provincial intervention is to provide a comprehensive approach in 
resolving financial crises in municipalities.61 
For less critical situations the Constitution and the MFMA allow , but do not 
mandate, provincial intervention.  Section 139(1) of the Constitution has been in place 
since 1996 and has been the basis for the majority of provincial interventions in 
municipalities to date.62  A study done on provincial interventions indicated that 
between 1998 and 2017, 140 interventions were initiated. Only 11 of these were 
instituted not using section 139(1) of the Constitution.63 Section 137 of the MFMA is 
rooted in subsection 139(1) of the Constitution, which provides as follows:  
 
54  Section 139(5) of the Constitution as well as ss 136 & 139 of the MFMA. 
55  De Visser  & November  (2017) at para 3.2; Ledger & Rampedi (2019) at 17 and Mnquma (2009)  at 
para 17. 
56  Ledger & Rampedi  (2019) at 17. 
57  Section 139(1) of the Constitution and De Visser & November (2017) at 109-133. 
58  Section 139(4) of the Constitution. See De Visser & November (2017) at 109-133 (para 3.2). 
59  Section 139(5) of the Constitution and De Visser & November (2017) at 109-133 (para 3.2). 
60  Sections 139(1), 139(4) & 139(5) of the Constitution. 
61  See Wandrag (2003) at 254. 
62  De Visser & November (2017) at 109-133.  
63  Ledger & Rampedi (2019) at 9. 
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“(1) When a municipality cannot or does not fulfil an executive obligation in 
terms of the Constitution or legislation, the relevant provincial executive may 
intervene by taking any appropriate steps to ensure fulfilment of that 
obligation.”64 
The High Court has indicated that an executive obligation is a fact which must be 
objectively established.65 Executive obligations should not be confused with statutory 
obligations (even if they are aimed at ensuring effective performance of 
municipalities).66 Failure to fulfil a statutory obligation might not always equate to a 
failure to fulfil an executive obligation. “Executive” should be understood as enshrined 
in section 11(3) of the Systems Act, which states how a municipality exercises its 
legislative or executive authority.67 Executive obligations also exclude obligations of 
municipalities which arise from other sources, such as contracts.68  
The Constitution provides a choice between three appropriate steps which can be 
taken by provincial government in the intervention process: the issuing of a directive, 
assumption of authority, or dissolving the municipal council.69 A directive may be 
viewed as a communication between the provincial executive and the municipality 
stating what actions should be taken/not taken by the municipality with the aim to 
recover from financial distress.70 Some debate exists about whether a directive is a 
precondition for the other two more intrusive methods of intervention.71 Issuing 
directives can reduce the possibility of lengthy interventions and can achieve acceptable 
results through the use of less intrusive interventions.72 The provincial executive may 
also assume a municipal responsibility, but the provincial executive may only assume 
that responsibility which is linked to the unfulfilled obligation of the municipality.73 The 
Constitution authorises the provincial executive to assume such a responsibility to the 
extent required to meet established minimum standards for rendering services.74  
The most extreme intervention is to dissolve the municipal council.75 The 
Constitution, in this case, requires that written notice be given to the Minister and the 
National Council of Provinces (NCOP).76 However, some debate can be observed within 
 
64  Section 137 of the MFMA. 
65  Mnquma (2009) at paras 65 & 66. 
66  Mnquma  (2009) at paras 65 & 66. 
67  Section 11(3) of the Systems Act. Mnquma (2009) at para 64. 
68  Mnquma (2009) at paras 65 & 66. 
69  Section 139(1) of the Constitution. De Visser & November (2017) at 109-133. 
70  De Visser & November (2017) at 109-133. See Wandrag (2003) at 256. 
71  De Visser & November (2017) at 109-133. 
72  De Visser & November (2017) at 109-133. 
73  De Visser & November (2017) at 109-133.  
74  Mnquma (2009) at para 63. 
75  Section 139(1)(c) of the Constitution; Hoffman-Wanderer & Murray (2007) at 141. See also De Visser & 
November (2017) at 109-133.  
76  Section 139(3) of the Constitution. 
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case law regarding whether the municipal council should be given notice and an 
opportunity to make representations as to whether it should remain in office.77 As 
already mentioned, it is also unclear whether less intrusive means of intervention 
should be exhausted before opting to dissolve a municipal council.78 
For a discretionary intervention per section 137 of the MFMA, the provincial 
executive is given a wide discretion in terms of what actions may be taken.  The MFMA 
suggests four specific actions: (a) assessing the seriousness of the financial problem; (b) 
seeking solutions that would be sustainable and would build the municipality’s capacity; 
(c) determining whether to request a financial recovery plan; and (d) consulting the 
mayor to obtain the municipality’s co-operation.79  The emphasis on sustainable 
solutions, on building the municipality’s capacity to manage its financial affairs, and the 
consultation with the mayor are all consistent with the overarching principle that the 
primary responsibility rests with the municipality itself.  
When it comes to a mandatory intervention in terms of section 139 of the MFMA, 
the province has fewer degrees of freedom.  In this case, the Municipal Financial 
Recovery Service (MFRS), an arm of the National Treasury, must be involved, and it is 
the MFRS that must assess the situation and determine the reasons for the crisis. A 
financial recovery plan is mandatory in this case, and it must be prepared by the MFRS 
rather than by “any suitable person”, as would be permitted in a discretionary 
intervention.80  Still, the mayor must be consulted to obtain the municipality’s co-
operation.81 The MFRS must determine the cause of the municipality's financial distress 
and any recommendations for corresponding changes to the budget or revenue raising 
measures.82 
The mayor has an obligation to report any serious financial problems and crises to 
the MEC for Local Government, thus alerting provincial government to the 
municipality's financial distress.83 In some cases, provincial governments appear to be 
reluctant to intervene, even where circumstances warrant mandatory interventions. 
However, in cases where mandatory interventions are warranted, if the province does 
not act, then it is possible to approach the judiciary for relief.84 The court may then 
provide a mandamus interdict, ordering the relevant provincial executive to intervene. 
Whether or not a court may specify what the appropriate steps should include in any 
given intervention is still debated. As a result, interested private parties, such as 
 
77  Mnquma (2009) at paras 33 and 85. 
78  Mnquma (2009) at para 72 and Mogalakwena Local Municipality v Provincial Executive Council, 
Limpopo & others [2014] ZAGPPHC 400 (Mogalakwena (2014)) at paras 17, 18 and 24. 
79  Section 137 of the MFMA and Wandrag (2003) at 244. 
80  Wandrag (2003) at 254. 
81  Section 139 of the MFMA. 
82  Wandrag (2003) at 263. 
83  Wandrag (2003) at 262. 
84  Mnquma (2009) at para 99; Mogalakwena (2014) at para 80 and Unemployed Peoples Movement v 
Premier, Province of the Eastern Cape & others (553/2019) [2020] ZAECGHC 1 at para 84. 
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creditors, may use complaint processes provided by municipalities to raise their 
concerns regarding the municipalities’ financial distress.85 Those with locus standi can 
use the financial emergency provisions in Chapter 13 of the MFMA if the municipality 
does not react to the concerns raised in the formal complaint. It enables creditors, 
citizens, employees or others to trigger the processes therein by making the MEC for 
Local Government in a province "aware that there is a serious financial problem in a 
municipality”.86  
This position further extends a right to the community to raise concerns regarding 
a municipality’s financial health (through petition and complaint procedures to the 
municipal administration and political structures) 87, and where these concerns are not 
addressed, to approach a competent court for further relief. For example, when Eskom 
threatened to disrupt the electricity supply to the eMalahleni Local Municipality due to 
its inability to pay the debt it owed to Eskom, the provincial executive failed to 
intervene as mandated by the Constitution. Subsequently, the community formed a 
group called the Save eMalahleni Action Group and sought redress from the High Court. 
The Save eMalahleni Action Group made legal history, as it was the first community 
group to compel the provincial executive to undertake an intervention in terms of 
section 139 of the Constitution.88 This case provides a clear illustration of the ability of a 
community to ensure that municipal financial distress is addressed appropriately.  
Chapter 13 of the MFMA structures interventions in such a way as to leave the 
council in control to the greatest extent possible. Chapter 13 describes a process of 
rehabilitation, rather than a provincial takeover.  The municipality is to be consulted, 
advised, and eventually circumscribed, but the municipal council remains in power and 
responsible for resolving financial distress, until and unless the council cannot or does 
not approve certain legislative measures.89 
 
85  Section 17(2)(a) of the Systems Act. 
86  Section 136(1) of the MFMA. 
87  Section 17(2)(a) of the Systems Act. 




pplementary_Founding_Affidavit.pdf (accessed 9 August 2019);  Goldswain Z "Save eMalahleni makes 
history" (2018) Witbank News available at https://witbanknews.co.za/115962/save-emalahleni-
makes-history/ (accessed 9 August 2019) and Masilela M "Residents can take municipalities to court 
for non-service delivery" (2018) SABC News available at 
http://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/residents-can-take-municipalities-to-court-for-non-service-
delivery/ (accessed 9 August 2019). 
89  The dissolution of the municipal council and appointment of an administrator can arise in two 
separate, related ways.  In the absence of a recovery plan, the municipal council may be dissolved 
pursuant to  
s 139(4) of the Constitution , if it fails to approve a budget or revenue raising measures       necessary to  
give effect to the budget.  If there is a recovery plan, then subsection 139(5)(b) mandates that the 
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The process of provincial intervention has been and is subject to critique, mostly 
because municipalities are left in a worse position after the intervention than they were 
before.90 One of the reasons is because, often, when an intervention is instituted the 
municipality is already, or very close to, complete operational and/or financial 
collapse.91 Municipalities provide misleading information to provincial government 
concerning their financial position, making it more difficult for provincial government 
to detect financial distress in municipalities.92 Another reason identified is the failure to 
implement legislation (pertaining to interventions) as it was intended, ignoring many 
provisions or incorrectly applying them.93 Also, there is no prescribed framework 
providing standard guidelines for administrative practices concerning the 
implementation of interventions. This results in a set of administrative practices 
becoming the norm, which does not convey the spirit of the legislation (pertaining to 
interventions).94  
Many municipal councils blame political reasons as being behind decisions whether 
or not to intervene, leaving the provincial intervention process open for political 
abuse.95 To substantiate this point, a trend was observed that the number of 
interventions increased shortly before local government elections.96 Interventions 
necessarily entail some disruptions in the political status quo of municipalities , and 
may be vulnerable to neutralise or empower political factions. A fluctuating political 
climate inevitably increases the political stakes surrounding an intervention.97 
4.1.2 Financial recovery plans 
Whether the intervention is discretionary or mandatory, and irrespective of who 
prepares the financial recovery plan, the process to obtain one and the content of a 
financial recovery plan are similar for the most part.98 There is consultation with the 
 
municipal council must be dissolved if the municipality does not approve a budget or revenue raising 
measures necessary to give effect to the recovery plan. 
90  Ledger & Rampedi (2019) at 4. 
91  Ledger & Rampedi (2019) at 8. 
92  Ledger & Rampedi (2019) at 8. 
93  Ledger & Rampedi (2019) at 4. 
94  Ledger & Rampedi (2019) at 8. 
95  Ledger & Rampedi (2019) at 9. See also Greffrath W & Van der Walt G "Section 139 Interventions in 
South African Local Government, 1994-2015" available at 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/310334863_Section_139_Interventions_in_South_African_
Local_Government_1994-2015 at 14 (accessed 20 November 2020). 
96  Greffrath W & Van der Walt G "Section 139 Interventions in South African Local Government, 1994-
2015" available at 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/310334863_Section_139_Interventions_in_South_African_
Local_Government_1994-2015 at 10 (accessed 20 November 2020). 
97  Greffrath W & Van der Walt G “Section 139 Interventions in South African Local Government, 1994-
2015” available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/310334863 Section 139 Interventions 
in South African Local Government 1994-2015 at 14 (accessed 20 November 2020). 
98  Section 142 of the MFMA.  
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municipality, with suppliers and creditors, the MECs for Finance and Local Government, 
and organised local government.99  The team preparing the proposed financial plan 
should submit it to all of the above for comment, and then publish it for comment by the 
community.100  The financial recovery plan must identify the particulars of the 
municipality’s financial distress and be designed to put it in a sound and sustainable 
financial condition as soon as possible.  It must include strategic objectives and a 
strategy for reducing expenses and increasing revenues.  It must identify the resources 
that are needed, describe a timeframe and milestones, and assign responsibility for 
actions.101 The recovery plan may also provide for the liquidation of non-essential 
assets, for debt restructuring, for special measures to prevent unauthorised, irregular 
and fruitless and wasteful expenditures and other losses, and it may identify revenue 
sources.102  
Because the primary responsibility for financial recovery still lies with the 
municipality and the council, even during a mandatory intervention, the recovery plan 
is intended to interfere as little as possible with the municipal council’s ability to set 
priorities and policies.  It does this by setting spending limits and recovery targets,103 ie 
a fiscal envelope within which the council must operate.  It provides budget parameters, 
but not the budget itself.  The plan identifies specific and necessary revenue-raising 
measures, but it does not itself impose those measures – they must be adopted by the 
council.  In the case of discretionary interventions, these same limits, parameters, and 
measures may be specified, but are not required to be.104 Furthermore, it can be 
inferred from the municipality's autonomous nature that nothing prevents the 
municipality from requesting a financial recovery plan before provincial intervention is 
triggered. By giving provincial government the competence to intervene in cases of 
financial distress, the Constitution and the MFMA have not prohibited the municipality 
from voluntarily engaging in solutions addressing its financial distress. Municipalities 
may therefore make use of financial recovery plans even when provincial government 
chooses not to intervene.105 
The implementation of a recovery plan will inevitably involve both the executive 
and the legislative functions of the municipality. In the case of a mandatory 
intervention, the municipality must implement the recovery plan, and the plan binds the 
 
99  Section 141(3)(a) of the MFMA. 
100  Section 141(3)(c) of the MFMA. 
101 Section 142(1)(a) of the MFMA. 
102 Section 142(1)(b) of the MFMA. 
103  Section 142(2)(a) of the MFMA. 
104  Section 142(2)(b) of the MFMA. 
105  Formulating a financial recovery plan provides municipalities with the opportunity to gain access to 
people with expertise in, and experience of, solving municipal financial problems. Formulating such a 
plan is not an admission of a financial crisis which warrants a mandatory intervention. The 
formulation of a financial recovery plan can take place as a precautionary measure. Therefore, a 
municipality can request one when it foresees financial problems and crises as envisaged in the 
MFMA, but before they reach the magnitude justifying an intervention. 
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municipality  to its executive and legislative functions.106  As regards legislative matters: 
while any budget and revenue measures must be within the limits of the recovery plan, 
the council and individual councillors are bound by, or compelled to adopt, such 
legislative matters , such as taxes, to give effect to the budget. However, councillors are 
only bound to adopt such measures to the extent required to give effect to the financial 
recovery plan.107  
It is also important to note that if the conditions for a mandatory intervention in 
terms of section 139(4) or 139(5) of the Constitution are met and the provincial 
executive cannot or does not adequately exercise the powers or perform the functions 
referred to in that section, the national executive must (a) consult the province and (b) 
act instead of the province.108   
4.1.3 Debt relief and restructuring 
Part 3 of Chapter 13 of the MFMA provides a quasi-bankruptcy process for 
municipalities in such dire straits that the restoration of financial health is impossible 
without some form of debt relief. Debt relief and restructuring can include a stay of legal 
proceedings against the municipality, a suspension of some of the municipality's 
financial obligations, or eventually a termination thereof.109 
Section 153(2) of the MFMA determines that for a municipality to receive debt 
relief in the form of a termination or suspension of financial obligations, some 
circumstances must be present. The provincial executive must have intervened, and a 
financial recovery plan will likely fail without some debt restructuring. In addition, the 
conditions of section 154 or section 155 (depending on the type of debt restructuring 
sought) must have been complied with.110 
Section 154 of the MFMA regulates the suspension of a municipality's financial 
obligations as a temporary debt relief measure.111 The suspension of financial 
obligations will be granted by a  court order only if the court is satisfied that the 
municipality is unable to meet its current financial obligations and all assets which the 
municipality does not reasonably need to sustain effective administration or to provide 
basic municipal services have been or are to be liquidated for the benefit of creditors. 
Similarly, section 155 of the MFMA regulates the termination of municipal financial 
obligations, and this relief measure permanently extinguishes a portion of the debt 
claim of a creditor.112 A municipality may be granted termination of certain financial 
obligations if the municipality cannot meet its current financial obligations and it is 
unlikely that it will be able to do so in the foreseeable future. Also, all assets which are 
 
106  Sections 145 & 146 of the MFMA. Wandrag (2003) at 263. 
107  Section 146(2) of the MFMA. 
108  Section 150(1) of the MFMA. 
109  Section 153(1) of the MFMA. 
110  Section 153(2) of the MFMA. 
111  Steytler N & De Visser J South African local government law 2nd ed Durban : LexisNexis (2018) at 15-53. 
112  Steytler & De Visser (2018) at 15-53. 
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not needed to sustain effective administration or necessary to provide basic municipal 
services must have been or be about to be liquidated for the benefit of creditors. In 
addition, municipalities must reduce their staff to include only employees who are 
affordable in terms of reasonably projected revenue. The liquidation process is to be 
administered through a distribution scheme (the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936, with the 
changes as the context may require, determines preference claims)113  put in place by a 
trustee  overseen by the MEC for Finance.114 For both sections 154 and 155, the 
municipality must have a financial recovery plan in place.  
A municipality may bring its financial situation to the attention of the MEC for Local 
Government to enable the municipality’s access to this quasi-bankruptcy procedure. If 
the municipality indicates that it faces a financial situation which qualifies as a financial 
crisis in terms of section 140 of the MFMA, the provincial executive must intervene in 
accordance with the wording of section 139 of the MFMA and section 139 of the 
Constitution. If the provincial executive fails to intervene despite the presence of a 
financial crisis, the municipality will be able to approach the court for an interdict 
mandating intervention by the provincial executive, together with a request for a 
financial recovery plan and stay of legal proceedings until the financial recovery plan is 
in place.115 
4.2   Other legislation that may help address financial distress in municipalities 
4.2.1 The Public Audit Amendment Act 5 of 2018 
The Auditor- General has the mandate to audit and report on the financial statements 
and management of all municipalities to determine if resources are being procured 
economically and utilised effectively and efficiently.116 The purpose of the Auditor- 
General's work is thus to identify cases where public funds are mismanaged. For some 
years the Auditor-General's powers were limited to routine audits and to the issuing of 
a report on its findings. 117 This limitation on the Auditor-General's powers was extreme 
and prevented the Auditor-General from influencing the financial management of 
municipalities. This left the Auditor-General without any competence to address 
financial problems/crises in municipalities caused by financial mismanagement. 
 In 2018 these powers were extended by the Public Audit Amendment Act 5 of 
2018. The Auditor-General may now conduct special investigations where  warranted 
by public interest or complaints and may then refer identified material irregularities to 
the relevant public bodies, such as the National Prosecuting Authority.118 In cases of 
material irregularities, the public body must keep the Auditor-General informed of the 
 
113  Section 155(3)(c)(ii) of the MFMA. 
114  Section 155(2) of the MFMA.  
115  Following the judgement given by the High Court to the Save eMalahleni Action Group. 
116  Section 188(1)(b) of the Constitution and s 5(1)(aA) of the Public Audit Act 25 of 2004. 
117  Section 5(1)(aA) of the Public Audit Act 25 of 2004. 
118  Section 5(1)(d) of the Public Audit Act 25 of 2004. 
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progress and outcome of the public body's investigation.119 In addition, the Auditor-
General has the power to take appropriate remedial action.120 After an audit has been 
performed, the Auditor-General may now make recommendations in the audit report 
regarding remedial action to be taken by the municipality as necessary to ensure that 
resources are procured economically and utilised effectively and efficiently.121 The 
implementation can be subject to a timeframe and the Auditor-General must follow up 
on the progress of such implementation.122 Where the remedial action is prescribed to 
address a material irregularity and has resulted in a financial loss to the State, the 
Auditor-General must include a directive in its recommendations.123 This directive must 
instruct the accounting officer to determine the amount of the loss suffered and then to 
recover the loss from the responsible person as required in terms of any legislation.124 
Should the accounting officer fail to comply with this directive, the Auditor-General may 
recover the determined loss from the accounting officer himself/herself.125   
For municipalities, the legislation which prescribes the recovery of funds lost to 
material irregularities is the MFMA. The MFMA sets out in relative detail when a 
political office-bearer or municipal official will be liable for unauthorised, irregular, 
fruitless or wasteful expenditure.126 It further determines that all unauthorised, 
irregular, fruitless or wasteful expenditure must be recovered by the municipality from 
the person liable, unless the municipal council certifies that this expenditure is 
irrecoverable or written off.127 However, if this decision is left exclusively to the 
municipal council, an opportunity is created for political interference. Section 176(2) of 
the MFMA also provides that a municipality may recover from the responsible person 
the loss or damage suffered as a result of intentional or negligent unlawful actions 
undertaken when performing a function under the MFMA.128  
Through the use of the word “may” in section 176(2) of the MFMA, the effect of this 
section is somewhat watered down, there being no obligation on municipalities to 
 
119  Section 5(1A) of the Public Audit Act 25 of 2004. 
120  Section 5(1B)(a) of the Public Audit Act 25 of 2004. The Material Irregularity Regulations (GN 526 in 
GG 42368 of 1 April 2019) explain in more detail ss 5A and B of the Public Audit Act 25 of 2004.  
121  Section 5A of the Public Audit Act 25 of 2004. 
122  The accounting officer is personally charged with overseeing implementation and may be held 
personally liable for any loss incurred by the State if he/she fails to implement the Auditor General's 
recommendations relating to material irregularities. 
123  Section 5A(2) of the Public Audit Act 25 of 2004. Section 1 of the Public Audit Act 25 of 2004, where a 
material irregularity is defined as "any non-compliance, or contravention of legislation, fraud, theft or 
a breach of a fiduciary duty identified during an audit performed that resulted in or is likely to result 
in a material financial loss, the misuse or loss of a material public resource or substantial harm to a 
public sector institution or the general public”. 
124  Section 5A(3) of the Public Audit Act 25 of 2004. 
125  Section 5B(1) of the Public Audit Act 25 of 2004. 
126  Section 32(1) of the MFMA. 
127  Section 32(2) of the MFMA. 
128  Section 176(2) of the MFMA. 
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address mismanagement. The extension of the Auditor-General's powers to issue a 
directive to recover the loss suffered by material irregularities reinforces the above two 
provisions of the MFMA. When the MFMA and the provisions of the Public Audit Act are 
read together, it is apparent that the Auditor-General now has the power to give effect 
to the provisions of the MFMA. Approaching the Auditor-General through a complaint 
may in this instance be a remedy where a municipality is faced with a financial crisis 
due to gross financial mismanagement. An example would be the unlawful investment 
of municipal funds in the VBS bank by municipalities, which resulted in losses for the 
municipalities as a result of the subsequent looting of VBS bank.129 These additional 
powers given to the Auditor-General equip it to recover funds that were wasted through 
material irregularities as in the above example. These powers may help provide relief 
for municipalities in a financial crisis arising from financial mismanagement. The MFMA 
and the Public Audit Amendment Act are therefore especially relevant in instances 
where municipalities are in financial distress as a result of gross financial 
mismanagement and financial misconduct, often in the form of abuse of power and 
corruption.  
 
4.2.2 The Disaster Management Act 57 of 2002 
Occasionally, negative externalities, such as disasters, can have a severe impact on 
municipal financial health.130 Disasters can be devastating to municipalities if they 
are not equipped with adequate resources to respond to the effects of disasters.131 
Municipalities do not only need those resources necessary to mobilise emergency 
disaster responses, such as emergency housing.132 They also require resources 
(financial, human or infrastructure) to cope with their usual day to day operations 
and functions, which may have been adversely affected. For example, a disaster 
may have resulted in a declining population which, in turn, may have decreased the 
municipality's revenue base. 
Globally, municipalities as basic service providers and “first” responders to 
disasters were at the front line of the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. This pandemic 
escalated on an unprecedented scale and is still accompanied by major disruptions 
of municipal budgets.133 The COVID-19 pandemic has tested municipalities' 
preparedness for disasters internationally, especially since most municipalities are 
 
129  Molefe R "VBS: 7 Limpopo Municipalities could be Placed under Administration" (2019) Mail & 
Guardian available at https://mg.co.za/article/2018-11-15-vbs-7-limpopo-municipalities-could-be-
placed-under-administration (accessed 18 September 2019). 
130  Watson , Handley  & Hassett  (2015) at 135. 
131  Watson, Handley & Hassett (2015) at 135. See also Dzigbede KD, Gehl SB & Willoughby K "Disaster 
resiliency of US local governments: insights to strengthen local response and recovery from the 
COVID-19 pandemic" (2020) Public Administration Review 634 at 635. 
132  Watson, Handley & Hassett (2015) at 139. See also Dzigbede, Gehl & Willoughby (2020) at 635. 
133  Dzigbede, Gehl & Willoughby (2020) at 634. 
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more proficient in dealing with  weather related disasters.134 Unlike weather 
related disasters, other facets increase the complexity of the COVID-19 disaster. 
COVID-19 crossed borders (effectively impacting almost every municipality/local 
government on the globe) and has a continuing nature.135 In South Africa, 
municipalities were faced with a number of challenges, including: under lockdown 
measures taken by national government, municipalities had to function with a 
reduction of their human resource capacity136 ; municipalities also had to deal with 
an unexpected decrease in their revenue base,137 while having to cope with 
additional expenses.138 
The provisions of the Disaster Management Act 57 of 2002 ( DMA) may be 
used for both natural or human induced disasters. The declaration of a disaster 
may unlock certain essential resources needed to address the effects of a disaster, 
such as municipal financial distress. When a disaster is declared, the municipality 
may authorise the release of any resources including skills, and human and 
monetary resources (for example, the appointment of a specialist in either debt 
counselling or municipal finance).139 It also allows  municipalities to do away with 
certain time-consuming and onerous budgetary, procurement, or other procedures 
by implementing emergency procurement procedures.140 To complement these 
provisions, the MFMA makes provision for emergencies, such as those caused by 
disasters, in terms of special procurement, budgeting and financial management 
measures.141 Declaring a disaster can promote the municipality's responsiveness in 
that decisions can be made and executed much quicker. Declaring a disaster may 
also be a tool to mobilise support from the Provincial Disaster Management Centre 
or to gain access to provincial resources.142 Taking these advantages into 
consideration, it may be helpful to look to the DMA to provide additional tools 
when a municipality is faced with a financial crisis, especially if  caused by abrupt 
changes in its economic circumstances (such as those induced by a natural disaster 
or the collapse of a main industry in a town). 
 
134  Dzigbede, Gehl & Willoughby (2020) at 635. 
135  Dzigbede, Gehl & Willoughby (2020) at 635. 
136  GN R480 in GG 43258 of 29 April 2020 and GN R 399 in GG 43147 of 25 March 2020. 
137  Under the strict lockdown measures, the majority of the South African workforce were unable to 
work, and a substantial number of workers did not receive salaries and wages. Although national 
government did take steps to compensate the workforce who did not receive salaries and wages, some 
still did not have enough finances to pay for municipal services. Less human resources also had an 
adverse impact on the municipalities' ability to effectively collect revenue. GN R480 in GG 43258 of 29 
April 2020 and GN R 399 in GG 43147 of 25 March 2020. 
138  Such as, additional sanitation measures and emergency clean water provision. 
139  Section 55(2)(a) of the DMA. 
140  Section 55(2)(l) of the DMA. 
141  De Visser J & Chigwata T C "Municipal Budgeting and Planning During COVID-19" Dullah Omar 
Institute 2020 available at https://dullahomarinstitute.org.za/multilevel-govt/publications/public-
participation-and-council-oversight-over-budgets-during-covid.pdf (accessed on 04 August 2020). 
142  Sections 23 & 30(1)(c), (d), (e) & (f) of the DMA. 
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Section 1 of the DMA defines “disaster” as 
“ a progressive or sudden, widespread or localised, natural or human-caused 
occurrence which- 
(a)  causes or threatens to cause- 
(i) death, injury or disease; 
(ii) damage to property, infrastructure or the environment; or 
(iii)  significant disruption of the life of a community; and 
(b) is of a magnitude that exceeds the ability of those affected by the disaster to 
cope with its effects using only their own resources”.143  
Van Wyk and Boshoff aver that the definition of  “disaster” in the DMA is very wide.  
The only limiting factor is that the occurrence must be of such a magnitude that the 
municipality cannot cope unless resources beyond its own are acquired.144 Uys 
expands on this explanation and believes that the definition of  “disaster” includes 
deliberate and untoward human-made occurrences.145 The explanation of this 
definition may imply that even if an occurrence is brought about by incompetence, 
ignorance, or negligence, it may still be declared  a disaster. The use of the word 
“progressive” in the definition of  “disaster” indicates that a disaster may be slow-
onset.146 Therefore, an occurrence may gradually increase in magnitude to a point 
where the municipality is no longer able to cope with the effects thereof. 
A disaster may thus be created and/or exacerbated by a financial crisis (as 
discussed in part 2.1 above) which results in a serious or persistent material 
breach of either a municipal financial obligation or a basic municipal service 
obligation. A financial crisis may be slow-onset, rooted in incompetence or 
ignorance, and human-made. Severe municipal financial distress has the potential 
to cause serious disruptions in the lives of members of the community. For 
example, in Cape Gate (Pty) Ltd & others v Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd & others the 
Emfuleni Local Municipality was unable to meet its financial obligation towards 
Eskom, and as a result Eskom threatened to suspend bulk electricity supply to the 
municipality.147  
The suspension of electricity supply can cause a serious disruption in the lives 
of the community. Similarly, a financial crisis can impair a municipality's ability to 
maintain essential infrastructure, such as, sewage and sewage treatment works. 
Illness, injury, and death can result from these instances. In other words, the 
consequences may be more than just a disruption of everyday life. The factors 
which are indicative of a financial crisis also indicate that the municipality does not 
 
143  Section 1 of the DMA. 
144  Van Wyk J & Boshoff B "The Disaster Management Act 57 of 2002: part panacea or recipe for 
disaster?" (2003) 18 (2) SA Public Law 457 at 462. 
145  Uys F "Disaster management: an overview" (2005) 2 Journal of Public Administration 404 at 406. 
146  Uys (2005) at 408. 
147   [2018] ZAGPJHC 599 at para 1. 
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have the resources (at least the financial resources) to cope with the financial 
crisis.148 It may therefore be possible to argue that in certain circumstances a 
financial crisis may in itself constitute a disaster.  
The South African national government declared the COVID-19 pandemic as a 
disaster in terms of the DMA on 4 March 2020.149 This unlocked a myriad of 
responses to the COVID-19 pandemic for local government. Some additional 
responses of national government included creating an exemption for 
municipalities from certain procedural financial management actions, such as 
adopting budgets before the beginning of the next financial year, and authorised 
municipalities to undertake expenses relating to COVID-19 responses.150 
Municipalities were also authorised to make use of emergency procurement 
processes and were given permission to continue rendering services despite a strict 
lockdown.151 Declaring this disaster also prompted national government to provide 
some guidance to municipalities on their responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, 
including provision of water and sanitation services, waste management and 
hygiene education, in the form of regulations or directives.152 In addition, national 
government made about R 5 billion available to municipalities for the provision of 
emergency access to services, such as, water for vulnerable communities and to 
sanitise public spaces, particularly public transport.153 However, providing 
additional infrastructure, skills or human resources was not part of national 
government's response package. Municipalities were left to their own devices to 
come up with and execute solutions to many problems, such as, maintaining 
effective revenue collection with a much smaller workforce, and adjusting to 
reduced income caused by residents who could not afford services.154  
South African local government has not been a stranger to corruption, and the 
already difficult circumstances of COVID-19 was not left untainted by it. Corruption 
has allegedly been present in many efforts to soften the impact of COVID-19, 
including the procurement of essential personal protective equipment, emergency 
 
148  See paragraph 2  above. 
149  GN R243 in GG 43066 of 4 March 2020. 
150  GN R429 in GG 43181 of 30 March 2020. 
151  GN R748 in GG 43503 of 30 July 2020. 
152  R 2 of  GN R399 in GG 43147 of 25 March 2020. 
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water infrastructure provision and relief food parcels.155 The national government's 
COVID-19 response relating to empowering and assisting municipalities to 
effectively address the many impacts this disaster had/has is a missed opportunity, 
especially since assistance could have been better provided to municipalities by 
making available, for example, unconditional finances together with strengthened 
anti-corruption efforts, infrastructure or human resources. The DMA could have 
been better used in this instance to mobilise resources to support municipalities 
which are dealing with the temporary effects of, or with the permanent transition 
to, a different financial position. 
5 CONCLUSION 
The media provide ample coverage of failing municipalities, sometimes characterising 
individual municipalities, or even the entire local government sphere, as dysfunctional. 
Reports of irregular or wasteful local government spending and service delivery 
protests reinforce the popular perception that many municipalities are in financial 
crisis. The analysis done by National Treasury provides an indication that this popular 
perception may very well be true. This focus prompted the authors to consider what 
legal remedies are available when municipalities face such a financial crisis.  
The law does provide legal remedies to address municipal financial distress. 
However, the worse the financial health of a municipality is before it is addressed, the 
less likely it is to restore it without intruding extensively on the municipality's 
autonomy. One of the more popularly used methods to address municipal financial 
distress is provincial intervention. Provincial interventions have been considered as 
ineffective for various reasons, including political interference or improper 
implementation. Financial recovery plans and debt restructuring as part of  provincial 
interventions have not been the subject of elaborate research. The lack of standard 
guidelines or best practices regarding provincial interventions, debt restructuring and 
financial recovery plans may be one of the reasons undermining their effectiveness in 
addressing municipal financial distress.  
Some other means to address municipal financial distress can be found in the DMA 
and the Public Audit Amendment Act 5 of 2018. The Public Audit Amendment Act  
empowers the Auditor-General to mobilise a process whereby losses due to malicious 
and gross financial mismanagement can be collected for the benefit of the relevant 
municipality. The DMA can be used to mobilise necessary resources to support 
municipalities which are dealing with the temporary effects of, or with the permanent 
transition to, a different financial position caused by a disaster. 
In conclusion, there are legal tools available to leaders who are determined to fix 
the problems. One should emphasise, however, that political will is necessary to drive 
 
155  Khumalo T "South Africa's double blow: Corruption and the coronavirus" DM available at 
https://www.dw.com/en/south-africas-double-blow-corruption-and-the-coronavirus/a-54423065 
(accessed 26 October 2020) and Fray P "South Africa the bigger pandemic is corruption" Good 
Governance Africa available at https://gga.org/south-africa-the-bigger-pandemic-is-corruption/ 
(accessed 26 October 2020). 
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these processes. The implementation of these legal tools in any municipality rests on the 
three pillars that constitute a municipality: the administration, the municipal council, 
and the community, all of which exist in a broader system of responsive public 
governance, co-operative government and good intergovernmental relations. 
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